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Ever since the start of the Industrial Revolution in Britain in the 1760s, innovation and
investment have been crucial elements in economic explanations of the dynamics of
capitalism. Classical economics recognises that innovation embodied in the form of new
machines through fixed capital investment is the essential process for realising economic
development. This study sets up a theoretical linkage between innovation and investment
in historical time, without reference to any static equilibrium model. In this way, the
relationship between instability of cycles and trend growth can be clearly identified.
A theoretical framework and specific model of innovation and investment are developed.
This is followed by an empirical investigation in support of this analysis to show
plausibility in the important linkages between innovation and investment that have been
missed when examined through static analysis of these relations. The statistical analysis
is based on recent Australian industry sector data (1984-98) on R&D and capital
expenditure in panel data form and in evolutionary industry life-cycle form. Conclusions
from this work indicate the need to re-examine the way strategies are formed and
developed in both the private and public sectors for more effective appropriation of
innovation into the investment planning process.
Keywords: R&D expenditure, industry life-cycles, Kaleckian investment, evolutionary
innovation processes.
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…Kalecki’s analysis provides for an endogenous rate of growth, albeit one which
rests on the stimulating effect of innovation on investment. (Sawyer, 1996, p. 107)
1.  The Issue - Dynamics of innovation and investment
Ever since the start of the Industrial Revolution in Britain in the 1760s, innovation and
investment have been crucial elements in economic explanations of the dynamics of
capitalism. Classical economics recognises that innovation embodied in the form of new
machines through fixed capital investment is the essential process for realising economic
development. This study sets up a theoretical linkage between innovation and investment
in historical time, without reference to any static equilibrium model. In this way, the
relationship between instability of cycles and trend growth can be clearly identified.
Recent Australian industry sector data is used in panel data form and in evolutionary
industry life-cycle form to identify important linkages between these two crucial elements
that have been missed when examined through static analysis. Conclusions from this
work indicate the need to re-examine the way strategies are formed and developed in both
the private and public sectors for more effective appropriation of innovation into the
investment planning process.
Technological innovative behaviour is based on the crucial input of research and
development (R&D) expenditure.
1 At the technological scientific level R&D induces new
technology systems and process innovation, while at the applied and experimental level
R&D is used to adapt such new systems and processes to a wide range of product
innovations. The more minor are the cost and product improvements that are associated with
R&D expenditure, the more mechanical the innovation process tends to be. Australian R&D
bifurcates into two quite distinct roles. There is the high public R&D into basic research,
which results in strong science-based output and is annexed quickly overseas. In contrast,
the private sector spends most of its R&D on applied and experimental activities that
involve the diffusion of overseas innovations into specific Australian-based product ranges.
In this study, R&D expenditure is the input variable into innovative behaviour that is under
investigation.
2 Innovation then in turn is appropriated as an artefact in the economy through
the investment process. Expenditure of fixed capital plant and equipment is the measure of
investment, and it represents spending on capital accumulation that creates the means of
production (MOP) of all processes and products that enable the capitalist system to sell
commodities in the marketplace. The dynamic roles of innovation and investment are
examined through private expenditures on R&D and MOP and then applied to specific
industry sectors for Australia in the period since private R&D expenditures have been
measured, that is, from 1984 to the latest available data in 1998.
                                                          
1 This study ignores non-technological innovation, based on organisational and labour practices and on new
marketing angles that do not involve R&D expenditure. Such innovative behaviour requires only a minor
level of capital expenditure, and as such does not form a significant link between innovation and
investment.
2 Innovation behaviour is broadly knowledge-based and relates to many social and technological
capabilities of an economy (see Woolgar, 1998). R&D is one identifiable important foundation into this
innovation process (see Freeman, 1995; Jankowski, 1998).4
The next section outlines the theoretical and empirical literature on innovation and
investment, followed by exposition of the Kaleckian framework of analysis used in this
study to link the two elements together. The dual structural method of employing the
Australian statistics (evolutionary and panel data) and the statistical results from this dual
approach are set out, followed by a pattern-matching explanation of the statistical results.
A section follows that notes the technical details and limitations of the statistical results.
Finally, a summary is presented indicating the policy implications of this analysis and
future research required both at the statistical and policy levels.
2.  The Literature - Overview of theory and empirical evidence
As the research field of economics deepened over more than two centuries since the
Industrial Revolution, the linkage between innovation and investment developed by early
classical writers has become more tenuous. Research in innovation and investment has
tended to be uncoupled, with linkage between the two becoming sporadic. Only
economists examining the economy as a vast interconnected “open systems” canvas
continued to maintain this link; notably in respect to the heritage of this study we can
identify Karl Marx, Rosa Luxemburg, 0LFKDáKalecki and Joseph Schumpeter.
Innovation research has taken two roads. One is the road to broad-based evolutionary
change in the long-term structure of capitalism, while the other is the road to narrow-
based entrepreneurship studies at the firm level. Attempts to incorporate investment into
the theoretical analysis of innovation have been limited (Stoneman, 1983, p. 202). Recent
books that review the innovation literature continue to reinforce this theoretical limitation by
having no analysis of innovation with investment (Dodgson and Rothwell, 1994; Freeman
and Soete, 1997). Two major exceptions to this are Salter (1960) from the neoclassical
perspective, and Freeman and Perez (1988) from the evolutionary perspective. Both
innovation studies set up economic “snapshots” which provide case study patterns to show
the plausibility of the theoretical relations they derive with respect to investment.
Salter examines technical change and its implications for MOP increments at the margin in
different industry sectors. In an exceptionally insightful manner, Salter recognises the gap
between available innovation and its application via investment. He uses market signals to
indicate possible postponements in the use of introduction of more innovative MOP and
consequent delays in scrapping old MOP, thus the capital stock becomes “fossilised” (Salter,
1960, p. 154). This exposes technical change to different rates of productivity between
industries.
Freeman and Perez (1988) take a dynamic structural adjustment view of the economy in
respect to innovation and note the mismatch of current investment to new available
technology. Rather than market signals, this study notes the variations in the climate of
confidence related to the type of innovation and the life-cycle of the industries which
account for this mismatch, leading to intensified investment instability. The study
concludes that:
The present wave of technical change sweeping through the world
economy is likely to exacerbate the problems of instability in investment,5
and of structural change at the national and international level and the
associated disequilibria in the international economy. (p. 63)
Investment research has also taken two roads. At the aggregate level, investment analysis
in its capital accumulation form occupies a central role in effective demand of income
determination and its impact on business cycles and trend growth. At the firm level, an
analysis of investment decision-making relates to the economic rational determination of
quantity of investment under various notions of uncertainty. In both forms, innovation (or
technical progress, as it is more generally referred to in the investment literature) is
characterised as a deuxs exs machina that adds an exogenous alteration to the investment
configuration, without explaining the link between innovation and investment. The
general justification for this is that “…the issues are quite complex and difficult to
model.” (Lavoie, 1992, p. 316)
From the neoclassical perspective, investment research generally ignores the role of
technological innovation except as some exogenous force and only on a single firm basis
when the role of entrepreneurship is brought into play. The central neoclassical literature on
investment behaviour is based on the seminal work of Dixit and Pindyck (1994) where
uncertainty is handled as calculable (or probabilistic) uncertainty, and capital stock is
homogenous that implies no role for innovation. At the aggregate level, the endogeneity of
technical change in the new growth models has still left the linkage highly tenuous. A recent
review of this literature in relation to innovation concludes that:
Although such [permanent] innovations are important sources of
fluctuations in macroeconomic data, they [new growth models] are unable
to explain large proportions of fluctuations in observed economic data…
Overall, the results reflect the inadequacy of one-factor neoclassical
stochastic growth models in describing the dynamic behaviour of (real)
macroeconomic variables, and suggest the need for alternative models of
economic growth. (Hossain and Chung, 1999, p. 1081)
Alternative investment models with innovation are available. The classic proposition comes
from Schumpeter (1939) where the investment function responds to waves of optimism and
pessimism that create clusters of innovation and thus, “bunching” of investment. This leads
to susceptibility for unstable investment cycles and the development of a trigger mechanism
to initiate fundamentally new innovation systems with long wave implications. Kalecki
(1962) reinforces the cycle-trend effect that innovation has on the investment function.
3 The
intensity of innovation affects both the amplitude of investment cycles and also shifts the
trend path of investment growth, by flows of vicious and virtuous circles. Virtuous circle
effect occurs as innovation intensity rises, increasing the amplitude of the upper turning
point of the investment cycle and shifting the trend path upwards.
4 Vicious circle effect
increases the amplitude of the lower turning point and shifting the trend downwards. Steindl
                                                          
3 Kalecki (1991, p. 455) endorses the Schumpeterian view when he states that “…capitalists investing
‘today’ think to have an advantage over those having invested ‘yesterday’ because of technical novelties
that have reached them.” Note, Kalecki often uses the word “invention” instead of “innovation” in many of
his discussions of technical progress. See Courvisanos (1996, p. 107) for resolution of this confusion.
4 Empirical evidence by Toivanen et al. (1999) support the notion of this virtuous circle effect.6
(1979, p. 7) formalises this by considering the pace of innovation as a shift parameter of the
Kaleckian investment function. Mensch (1979) provides an extensive economic history of
the cluster innovation effect and its sequencing to investment.
The cause of clustering of innovation and subsequent bunching of investment (“clust-bun”)
is in debate (see Freeman, 1994, pp. 86-9). The common Kaleckian feature of expanded
reproduction appears in this debate that has not been recognised by the protagonists in this
debate. The prerequisite for clustering is deep depressions or breakthroughs in technology,
both reflect reactions by private sector (in the former case) and public sector (in the latter
case) to deep problems in the downswing of the previous business cycle. Then, the bunching
requires effective demand stimulus through widespread diffusion of the cluster effect that
can only be done through the availability of a surplus for investment (private profits and
public deficit spending). Roadblocks to this “clust-bun” effect reside in the institutional
frameworks of nations; particular the ones with still dominant mature industries with older
technologies (Freeman and Perez, 1988, pp. 58-65). Increased uncertainty arising from large
investment in the new technology systems also adds a roadblock through increased
macroeconomic volatility, which Toivanen et al. (1999) empirically identify as slowing
down the diffusion process.
The causality sequencing of innovation and investment is reversed by Kaldor (1961) and
Schmookler (1966), with the rate of investment determining the rate of innovation. Kalecki
also recognises this sequence, despite having identified the innovation-driven process (see
especially footnote #3 above). Kalecki places this investment-driven process clearly into an
appropriate context by viewing this innovation process as “...part and parcel of ‘ordinary’
investment” (Kalecki, 1954, p. 158), or endogenous innovation. Geroski and Walters (1995,
p. 926) empirical investigation supports endogenous innovation, concluding that demand
matters, “…although it is evident that it plays only a relatively modest role in stimulating
innovative activity”. In a statistical note to this study, Collins and Yao (1998) argue that the
data does not support this conclusion. Further, Geroski and Walters (1995, p. 925)
themselves signal in a footnote (#17) the possibility that “…more basic or fundamental
[exogenous] innovations have different cyclical patterns from the less substantive
[endogenous] innovations, and this may explain these differences in results.”
5
Instead of unidirectional causality, the discussion above clearly leads to a circular flow
where one innovation process feeds into the other. Kaldor (1966) introduces the principle of
cumulative causation, which is the “self-reinforcing dynamics” in the circular process of
investment demand leading to innovation which then stimulates further investment. The
distinction between exogenous and endogenous innovation specifies how innovation enters
this cumulative causation process. In this context, Gomulka (1990, pp. 45-7) sees R&D
expenditure as central to the endogenous innovation process, with large firms with strong
profit results having the ability to activate large R&D spending. Patents seem to reflect more
the clustering of innovations (Geroski and Walters, 1995, p. 924).
                                                          
5 See Courvisanos (1996, pp. 44-50) for more on the distinction between endogenous and exogenous
innovation from Kalecki’s use of both these innovation processes.7
Concluding this literature review on the broad perspective, is a study that attempts to
provide ergodic closure to the Kalecki trend and cycle theory. The study argues that
Kalecki's central role of innovations in preventing the trend rate of unemployment from
increasing is unsupportable, as “…the balanced growth rate which Kalecki took to be stable
is, in fact, unstable, rendering it unsuitable to serve as the trend growth rate.” (Gomulka et
al., 1990, p. 535) Lavoie (1994, pp. 297-327) examines Kalecki’s innovation and investment
analysis at the theoretical level and rejects the ergodic closure assumption in Gomulka et al.
which ties his theory to the neoclassical mainstream. Kalecki clearly assumes that the rate of
capacity utilisation may diverge from its full-capacity rate even in the long run and the
“…reserve army of the unemployed are typical features of capitalism at least throughout a
considerable part of the cycle.” (Kalecki, 1971, p. 137) This asserts instability, as the
dynamic non-ergodic business cycle has innovation creating conditions that move the trend
growth away from any analytical “stability”. At the practical level, Kalecki’s time unit of
analysis of one year is sufficient to avoid any “…unsuitable solutions of the equation.”
(Steindl, 1991) The conclusions here are important, since the next section uses a non-ergodic
dynamic Kaleckian model of cycles and trend to link innovation and investment in order to
analyse the empirical data subsequently presented.
3.  The Model - Kaleckian macroenvironment and industry analysis
A three phase model-building structure is developed in this section. First, a description of
the Kaleckian framework of analysis within which the model is operating is set out. This
clearly sets up the dynamic mechanisms and absolves the ensuing model from any need to
find stability conditions or any other neoclassical presupposition. Second, a flow-chart is
provided to show how the dynamics operate over historical time to furnish both cycles and
trend with innovation as crucial to the investment process. Third, establish a series of
equations and a grid matrix specifically applied to tell a plausible story with the statistical
data available in Section 4 that follows.
3.1  Descriptive Kaleckian framework of analysis
Using Kalecki’s extended reproduction model, three observable variables are central to
Kaleckian investment decision-making firms. These are profits, increasing risk (extending
the gearing or leverage ratio) and excess capacity. Within an institutional framework of
monopoly capitalism, a susceptibility cycle model is developed by Courvisanos (1996)
which measures the tensions that are built up when investment decisions are being made,
with the three variables above acting as the barometers of this tension. During an investment
boom, these tensions grow to such an extent that investment is highly susceptible to a
collapse. In a historical context, such high susceptibility can be identified with falling profit
rates, increased finance costs and gearing ratios, and falling utilisation rates. This build up of
tension is based on the implementation of a long run firm investment strategy. When high
susceptibility is reached, any minor factor (endogenous to the susceptibility cycle or
exogenous) can add another small amount of tension that will be enough to suspend or
cancel investment orders, sending the investment (activity) cycle down as a result.8
At the upper turning point of the susceptibility cycle, all firms experience high susceptibility
and thus fragility of the situation induces a reversal in investment orders. The investment
downturn that follows is timed tightly around the pressures to contract investment which
affect all firms to a varying degree, but at the same time. The timing and amplitude of the
lower turning point is much more problematical than the upper turning point. Pressures to
contract investment orders come from too high susceptibility across all firms. Pressures to
expand investment orders come when susceptibility is low, and it depends on the more
problematical issue of when a firm (or industry) wants finally to take the plunge. Tightly
owned companies with less risk aversion tend to lead investment orders out of the doldrums,
while the State tends to assist firms during this period by reducing costs of production
through direct (e.g. subsidies) and indirect (e.g. unemployment benefits) deficit spending.
These two factors strongly determine the timing and nature of the upturn.
Based on Kalecki’s view of innovation, endogenous innovation is of secondary importance
from the scientific standpoint, coming as it does from:
(i)  slight improvements or adaptations on previous capital equipment;
(ii)  some improvement in quality or design or new packaging of old products so that
they look “new” (e.g. fins on an old style car model);
(iii)  some new “vein” or extension of previous raw material sources.
This innovation is most common and involves new investment spending as a matter of
course when business is ongoing. In relation to the susceptibility cycle, such innovation is
called endogenous because it is the cycle itself that induces the innovation and with it,
higher levels of investment orders.
6
The firm's R&D expenditure is a form of intangible investment to be incorporated in the
long-term business investment plan. This enables the firm to hold a stock of innovations that
are ready to be applied when susceptibility is relatively low. In this way endogenous
innovation can be “...generated and directed by a process of investment” (Steindl, 1976, p.
133). When a firm decides to increase investment at relatively low susceptibility under
competitive pressures and higher costs of postponement, the R&D investment in the past
makes these innovations ready to implement.
7 R&D investment effectively increases the
strategic capacity of the firm, enabling it to increase MOP that are innovative. R&D
expenditure may be constant throughout the investment cycle, or may vary under the same
susceptibility pressures as MOP commitments. Which of the two it is depends on how
important R&D is for the firm and industry. In an industry where innovation is a regular
competitive strategy, R&D expenditure would be large and would vary under the same
susceptibility pressures as capital expenditure. In an industry where innovation is only
occasionally implemented, R&D expenditure would be small and constant over the
investment cycle.
At high susceptibility firms are under pressure to postpone investment orders, and with it
shelving of endogenous innovations and possible reduction of R&D expenditures. This
                                                          
6 Steindl (1976, p. 133) describes this endogenous innovation very neatly: “Technological innovations
accompany the process of investment like a shadow, they do not act on it as a propelling force.”
7 The firm can also buy out smaller uncompetitive firms during the contractionary stage of the investment
cycle, taking advantage of innovations developed by failed firms.9
alleviates pressure of growing susceptibility, by concentrating on profit returns from old
MOP which has a proven track record from its production, rather than the higher but more
unpredictable returns from new MOP.
8 Only small increases in capacity investment to
protect existing MOP emerge at high levels of susceptibility. In the cyclical context,
endogenous innovation postponement is induced from high susceptibility and it then adds
pressure for the slow down and eventual contraction of investment orders. In the trend
growth context, any long postponements of new innovative capital investment would
produce a mismatch of current investment to new available technology in the economy,
creating a roadblock to the “clust-bun” effect.
At low susceptibility firms introduce endogenous innovations, both in the form of process
and product innovation, under the pressure of competition. Given that the technostructure
needs to implement the long-term investment strategy with innovation incorporated therein.
9
Then this need creates increasing competitive pressure during the contraction of the
susceptibility cycle when investment orders are declining and little new investment is going
on. The costs of postponing a long term investment strategy increases over time with the
knowledge that other large firms in the industry (or ready to come into the industry) have the
technology also to increase their market share and growth. These pressures, along with
pressures for State-based stimulus, lead to some increase in investment embodied with
endogenous innovation.
The creation endogenously of innovations out of low susceptibility makes some MOP
obsolete and thus not part of excess capacity calculation. Also, oligopoly firms (and
industries) lobby for the assistance of governments in reducing social costs of production
(through subsidies, tax concessions or protection) when these firms attempt to expand their
market by innovations in order to utilise new, and decommission old, idle productive
capacity (O'Connor, 1973, p. 27). Such innovation and under-writing of the related risks
reduce the rate of increase in susceptibility and encourages an investment recovery.
However, these actions by firms and governments are not guaranteed to occur at any
particular time or with any particular force. The institutional framework of a country (and
region) will have a lot to do with the strength and timing of the upturn in investment orders.
R&D amounts in aggregate to a large body of investigation going on continuously (at
different rates of intensity). This large R&D spending and related innovation effects are
bound to lead to some major new “discovery” or “invention” which is related to the total
aggregate R&D, rather than any particular one R&D project. This discovery is linked to
possible small developments in various laboratories and informal networks between firms
and industries, eventually coming to fruition in some way divorced of any specific
competitive behaviour. New technological paradigms come out of such aggregate
developments and are the basis of structural change to a new long wave of boom and
prosperity (Freeman and Perez, 1988, pp. 47-58). Changes in technological systems and
paradigms arise only after all the minor improvements (endogenous innovation) are
                                                          
8 See Toivanen et al. (1999) for empirical support.
9 See Galbraith (1974) on the role of technostructure in planning investment strategies and specific
technologies for the ongoing survival and growth of the large corporation. For a recent re-interpretation of
the technostructure from a Post-Keynesian perspective, see Dunn (2000).10
squeezed out of the old systems and paradigms by “monopoly capital” entrepreneurs who
want to protect existing MOP and delay the new paradigm taking over. There is also “log
jam” in endogenous innovations based on the new paradigm which compounds the latter’s
slow initial adoption. This occurs when established powerful entrepreneurs, with much old
MOP, cannot justify the entire shake-up of industries, since not enough interrelated clusters
have been formed.
10
Technological paradigm shift leads to exogenous innovation input affecting the
susceptibility cycle. Introduction of a new paradigm produces a large exogenous boost to
industry investment at low susceptibility points. This investment boom relates to paradigm
changes in large important industry sectors that adopt new technology systems (e.g. petro-
chemical innovations), or in the whole economy (e.g. steam engine innovations). Either
way, the investment boom is strong and resilient over a series of future cycles in
susceptibility.
Exogenous innovation occurs in an industry generally at the low susceptibility point, where
competitive pressure exists on entrepreneurs to introduce it. When investment activity is
high and susceptibility is high, entrepreneurs are not receptive to major new developments,
but rather continue squeezing profits from the old paradigm, given the already large
commitments made to this old paradigm during the rise of investment from the trough. As
susceptibility is falling with investment order downturn, the financial constraints of high
gearing in the industry are eased as debts are paid off or receivers are appointed. At low
susceptibility the industry is financially restructured and becomes conducive to new
investment orders. However, at this point it is not clear if or when the lower turning point of
investment orders will be based on the decreasing opportunities from the old paradigm
(providing only a modest upturn) or on the uncertainty of the new paradigm. Breakdown of
an old technological paradigm occurs in readapting this old paradigm through minor
innovations. Uncertainty of future profits reduces investment orders and susceptibility
further. At this point even replacement investment is postponed, sending the susceptibility
cycle even lower.
As the institutional framework slowly adapts to the new technological system,
entrepreneurs’ reactions against uncertainty of profits come from competitive pressures and
growing inefficiencies of old MOP. This induces adaptation (by industries) and imitation
(within industries) to technological trajectories that are totally new, establishing at very low
susceptibility, the new investment upturn. It is creating a new investment boom and at the
same time “...re-establishing the conditions for a new phase of steady development.”
(Vercelli, 1989, p. 135) A paradigm shift occurs when the new adapted technological
systems pervade the whole economy. Many from the evolutionary school identify such a
shift with the beginning a new long wave in the economy's development (see Kleinknecht,
1987).
Analysis in this section allows linking together the two types of innovations described by
Baran and Sweezy (1966), namely “normal” (or endogenous) and “epoch-making” (or
                                                          
10 For example, separate innovations in different aspects of a lightweight solar car have been developed, but a
strong enough cluster has not been formed to push the steel petrol engine into the museum.11
exogenous). A period of secular decline in economic development can now be associated
with the limitations of scale production in oligopolistic competition, as the old technology
systems are running out of possible new adaptations. Diffusion of the old systems through
endogenous innovation slows down and imitators become considerably fewer. The large
powerful corporations attempt to protect existing capital values and ignore the new
technological systems being developed on the fringe of the corporate world. This tends to
exacerbate the mismatch between new technologies and powerful institutional framework
based around monopoly capital. It was Steindl, back in 1952, who recognised this secular
decline as the incentive to reduce surplus capacity and invest in established monopoly
capital sectors. In his 1976 introduction to the 1952 book reprint, Steindl stated that he was
“...ready to admit a possibility which I denied in my book: that it might be the result of
exhaustion of a long technological wave” (1976, p. xv). In this way, the conclusions of the
Kaleckian and evolutionary traditions can be integrated.
3.2  Flow-chart macroenvironment and instability
Figure 1 summarises in aggregate terms the dynamics of cycles and trend described above.
The figure will be used in this section to show how these dynamics set the
macroenvironment of virtuous and vicious circular flows within which the firms and their
entrepreneurial agents conduct innovation and investment decisions.







The outside perimeter of Figure 1 is the National Innovation System (NIS) which carries the
institutional framework within which endogenous and exogenous innovation occurs, and
investment cycles operate. Freeman (1995) provides the historical context for such NIS to
exist, and explains how such systems determine the way new and old technological
paradigms interact within the national boundaries. This perimeter framework can also be
adopted at international regional levels (e.g. EU, NAFTA, ASEAN) and at sub-national
regional levels, only the specifics of each perimeter need to be established. The role of the12
state is not specifically identified in Figure 1, with its influence remaining in the NIS
perimeter, while the circular flow itself has no government sector and no impact through
public expenditures and revenues (taxes, etc.).
Figure 1 is a circular flow through historical time. The explanation of the circular flow
diagram within the NIS can begin at any point without any loss of explanatory power.
Following Ricottilli (1996), the explanation begins with the innovation decision-making
process and it is specified as equation 1:
                                      d = f1 (RD, L) (1)
where d is change in technology (or simply innovation), and it is dependent on the extent of
R&D expenditure input (RD) and the current cognitive learning and institutional knowledge
capabilities (L) measured in efficiency units. The L term is determined by the given state of
the NIS, including networks of social relations
11 and technological capabilities imported
from overseas through licensing, joint ventures and foreign direct investment. In Figure 1,
two arrows pointing to the d variable represent equation 1.
Equation 2 states that: I = f2 (P, d) (2)
where I is investment (or the rate of change of MOP), and it is dependent on the profit level
(P) and innovation (d). Profit levels represent the extent that retained earnings are used for
funding investment, while d represents the endogenous flow of innovation incorporated into
investment as discussed in Sub-section 3.1. These two variables form the crucial decision-
making elements that relate to the level of susceptibility in the investment process. The P
level in a Kaleckian framework also indicates the ability of firms to obtain external funds
through the principle of increasing risk (Kalecki, 1937), which explicitly identifies stronger
profit levels as the increasing ability of firms to attract riskier external sources of funds.
Higher P overall gives entrepreneurs stronger positive expectations for implementing the
investment decisions on the basis of equation 2.
A more sophisticated investment model than equation 2 would be represented by profits as
the essential extended reproduction variable, but also including the change in profits
(expectations), increasing risk (gearing ratio) and capacity utilisation as explained in Sub-
section 3.1.
12 This paper concentrates on the innovation-profit-investment linkage, with
gearing ratio and capacity utilisation rates not systematically analysed.
In Figure 1, the circular flow from investment (I) follows a standard Keynesian
macroeconomic route, as I feeds into aggregate demand (AD) as its most volatile component
even though it generally accounts for around 20 per cent of total AD. Then, changes in AD
directly affect the income determination level (or GDP). The changes in GDP directly
impact on the distribution of profits (P) which consists of a given stable level of distributed
earnings, while the rest is the variable retained earnings (RE) for investment (see
Asimakopulos, 1975). RE generally accounts for around 75 per cent of total business fixed
                                                          
11 See Woolgar (1998) on the need for “…a process of changing networks of social relations” (p. 451) in
the NIS.
12 See Courvisanos (1996, pp. 161-2) for the exposition of this more sophisticated investment function.13
investment in capitalist economies. It is this RE element which represents the direct profit
flow of funds back into investment (I).
13
In his review of the innovation literature, Gomulka (1990, pp. 45-7) identifies the important
influence of profitability on the level of R&D spending in the aggregate, despite larger firms
tending to spend a lesser proportion of profits on R&D than smaller firms. In more general
terms, Kalecki (1962) supports this same position but notes the long and complex time-lag
involved for profits to influence “the stream of inventions”. Thus, the Figure 1 flow from P
to RD is more variable than the P-I flow and importantly, also occurs over a longer time
horizon. This is represented by a dotted line, indicating that this flow is not in the same time
dimension as all the other flows. All unbroken line flows tend to be more direct and quicker
in their impact on the variables they flow on to. For the empirical research in the next
section that is based on a relatively short timeframe, RD is considered as exogenous.
To close the circular flow, RD has two flow impacts. One is the already identified monetary
flow into innovations via equation 1. The other is the RD input flow, in terms of aggregate
expenditure from all firms, directly into the NIS.
14 Larger RD has a positive impact on the
knowledge and learning capabilities of any given NIS. The input is direct, but the impact on
NIS is cumulative over a long historical process. Within the dominant technological
paradigm, the effect is for exogenous innovation to flow through the L term back into the
circular flow and to the d variable. At the same time, a “constellation” of technical and
economic factors mounts up towards a structural break where a new paradigm emerges,
altering radically the given NIS. When the radical break occurs, exogenous innovation
becomes the crucial factor through the L term in the paradigm shift and that leads directly to
a strong expansion of the investment cycle (as discussed in Sub-section 3.1).
Dynamics of this circular flow can be exhibited by the explication of the virtuous and
vicious circles defined in Section 2. The virtuous circle can be seen in aggregate when
increase in RD leads to a rise in d, which encourages expansion of I (Nickell and Nicoltsas,
1996). This has a direct positive impact on AD, GDP and consequently on P, which then
creates an accelerationist effect on I flowing through greater economic activity and the
expansion phase of the investment cycle. An endogenous innovation-based reinforcement of
this circle is the increased innovation intensity via the dotted flow-line from P to RD adding
another rise in d to push the expansion phase further into a strong boom. This dynamic circle
exhibits innovation intensity deriving from the growth industries of the endogenous
innovation effects of a powerful exogenous technological paradigm. The virtuous circle has
all the elements associated with the “Schumpeter Mark II” effect that Malerba and Orsengio
(1993) identify, where increase in RD leads to “creative accumulation”.
As investment orders build up there is an increase in susceptibility to an investment
downturn through the normal route of growing excess capacity, rising gearing ratios and
                                                          
13 On the theoretical details of the “double-sided relation between profits and investments”, see
Asimakopulos (1977).
14 See Jankowski (1998) for evidence on both roles of R&D in the foundations of innovation even as
structural changes alter its nature and activity, reflecting the shift to information technology R&D and its
input into the services sector.14
tensions when P is high, but the relative increases in P slow-down and even begin to
decrease (see Courvisanos, 1996, p. 161). Given the constancy of the capacity and gearing
variables this simplified model, Figure 1 can isolate a further susceptibility tension via the
innovation link to the virtuous circle. As RD continues its endogenous innovation push,
there is tension with the development a greater economic uncertainty in investment more
“new” products and processes, as identified by Driver and Moreton (1992). This is the
“Schumpeter Mark I” effect, where new innovations have the creative destruction of older
“established” MOP value which has strong monopoly control. Depending on the NIS
framework, this problematic tension to the virtuous circle will appear as a strong negative
susceptibility force at different intensities of the endogenous innovation-based expansion
phase in the investment cycle.
15 Such negative susceptibility ensures that no expansion
phase of the investment cycle can ever be permanent, as the level of fundamental
uncertainty will continue to rise disproportionately to the acceleration of the virtuous circle
effect.
The vicious circle appears in the contraction phase of the investment cycle, when the
susceptibility tensions of the expansion phase have eventually created the upper turning
point. In aggregate when there is a decrease in RD, this leads to a decrease in d, which
discourages I as well. This has a negative impact on AD, GDP and consequently on P,
which then creates a negative accelerationist effect on I flowing through lower economic
activity and the contraction phase of the investment cycle. An endogenous innovation-based
reinforcement of this circle is the decreased innovation intensity via the dotted flow-line
from P to RD adding another fall in d to push the contraction phase further into a strong
recession. This vicious circle exhibits innovation intensity that is very weak, deriving from
the mature industries of the long established endogenous innovation effects of a monopoly
controlled “old” exogenous technological paradigm.
In the susceptibility cycle, investment contractions lead to a problematic downturn of
indeterminate speed (slope of the contraction) and trough of indeterminate intensity and
length (amplitude and periodicity). The susceptibility levels fall by the extent of the profit
falls and the speed that balance sheets are restructured after serious gearing-based failures.
The length of the trough depends on competitive pressures and higher costs of postponing
endogenous innovation-based investment. The growing inefficiencies (both technical and
market related) of old MOP weaken the strategic capacity of firms to the point that this
established MOP capacity is decommissioned and investment begins to build up again with
endogenous innovations. These pressures undermine the vicious circle effect, to the point
that it shifts into a virtuous circle effect. These same pressures are greater under the
influence of a new exogenous-based technological paradigm, whereas under the monopoly
control of a mature technology paradigm there is less pressure with greater likelihood that
the vicious circle will continue for a longer period.
                                                          
15 There is evidence that in the 1990s this innovation-based susceptibility has taken root much more quickly
and strongly in Europe than in the USA and Australia. In the latter nations the information technology-
based innovation expansion phase has been very strong compared to that of Europe (see Hollanders et al.,
1999).15
Operation of the two circular flow effects above result in irregular investment cycles of
variable volatility. These cycles have varying degree of fluctuation in terms of investment
activity, and it is expressed as a variance (or standard variation) of the I variable. Although
endogenous innovations have an influence on this instability via the amount of I, it is the
influence of exogenous innovations that distinguish clearly periods of low volatility (with
established industries in monopoly control) and periods of much higher volatility, when a
new technological paradigm is being implemented. Successful implementation of such new
systems will provide strong expansion out of a deep recession, creating an impression of
powerful stable growth in an ahistorical perspective. From the historical perspective, this is a
very strong expansion phase of the investment cycle with growing susceptibility pressures
for an eventual strong downturn. Less successful implementation of the new systems will
result in many aborted efforts to rise out of the deep recession, with only limited success, but
also with limited build-up of susceptibility pressures that provides only weak contractionary
pressures. Combination of these two patterns on a global perspective have emerged in the
1990s (former being the South East Asia and USA, latter being Europe and Southern Asia)
showing convergence within global regions, and divergence across different global regions
(Hollanders et al., 1999).
3.3  Equations and grid matrix for industry sector analysis
Depending on the available data and the level of complexity introduced in the statistical
research, different equations can be developed out of Sub-sections 3.1 and 3.2 above. An
equation that examines the flows from RD and P to I within the circular flow diagram is
specifically developed in this sub-section. The equation is then applied to a set of Australian
statistical data in order to tell a plausible story at the industry sector level of the dynamics of
innovation and investment. Equation 3 encapsulates the essence of the circular flow
diagram with equations 1 and 2, in the form of a dynamic version of a Cobb-Douglas
function, such that:
       I = c P
a RD
b (3)
where P and RD are the two variables that influence I, given the short term constancy of
the L term. The constant c has all other influences, notably the role of the state on
investment. Note that Equation 3 specifies investment as a multiplicative function of
profits and R&D, so that raising one of these two “inputs” also increases the “efficiency”
of the other.
Given the available time series data that has a large absolute range of numbers from very
small to very large, it has been necessary to turn equation 3 into log form such that
equation 4 reads:
                           ln I = ln (c) + a ln (P) + b ln (RD) (4)
It is the form of equation 4 that investment will regressed in the data that follows. The P
to RD link is longer-term and is left as statistically exogenous, while the link from I across16
to P is given by the aggregate demand effects of the rate of investment, which determine
to a large extent capitalists’ profits.
16
From the perspective of industry life-cycles, the discussions above can be summarised in
the grid matrix of Table 1. A grid matrix enables empirical patterns in qualitative terms to
be identified, from which classifications can be constructed that assist in explaining the
regression results in the equations that have been developed above. Table 1 differentiates
the role of innovation in industries according to their life-cycles and type of RD. The
Table then relates each of the industry life-cycle stages to their respective effects on
investment decision-making in these industries, and impact on aggregate investment as
industries cluster within these respective stages. This grid provides the basis for the
evolutionary method used to analyse the statistical data of the industry sectors and their
contributions to the innovation-investment process.



































































































Source: Adapted from Courvisanos (1996, p. 201)
Based on empirical work, Scherer (1984, p. 4) has a graph showing RD leading I in
industry sectors. Figure 2 applies the life-cycle stages in Table 1 to the Scherer graph.
The length of stages will greatly vary across industries, and Figure 2 being schematic
only should not be interpreted as if each stage is of equal length of time. This figure
draws together RD and I in an evolutionary approach to provide the basic theoretical
                                                          
16 The Kaleckian I to P link (“capitalists get what they spend”) has been confirmed by a series of empirical
studies covering the U.S.A. (Asimakopulos, 1983), U.K. (Arestis et al., 1985-86) and Italy (Sylos Labini,
1967; and Del Monte, 1981).17
pattern as a template for pattern-matching examination of each industry sector’s RD and I
data. Figure 2 shows gross endogenous investment (new net investment plus replacement
investment) take-off after industry has come out of the infant stage when relatively little
investment is going on at the time when RD is essentially basic and the sophisticated end
of applied RD.
In Part I of the growth stage the industry is rapidly evolving with much applied and
experimental development RD leading to an increasing rate on essentially new
investment. Part II of the growth stage has applied and experimental RD decreasing and
new investment continuing to increase but at a decreasing rate. RD falls to virtually zero
in the mature stage as only replacement investment keeps the level of gross investment
constant. Human resources devoted to RD are the highest in this growth stage, with
associated large labour-intensive RD activities.
In the final stage, industries have two alternative paths. One path is the transition stage (t)
which meets the challenges of new technology systems through the industry reinventing
itself with initially lower investment and then taking-off into new investment “on the
back” of strong RD input. The other path is the decay stage (d) which leads to industry
decline, with no RD and only replacement investment, which eventually creates such
large excess capacity that even replacement investment collapses.



















Note:       Identifies beginning of stage18
4.   The Australian Data - Structure and results
Australian industry sector data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) are
collated annual in financial years (July-June) from when R&D expenditure become
available on a regular basis (1984-85) up till the latest available R&D figures (1997-98).
Figures for profits and investment for the same years have also been collated and set up
in accord with the R&D figures to obtain a complete data set that is then used in
statistical and evolutionary grid analysis. To set the specific macroenvironment, Figure 3
shows levels of investment (I), GDP or Gross Domestic Product (as proxy for P), and
Australian patent applications in the USA (proxy for d) in index number terms with the
base as 1950. The data extends from 1950 through to 1998.
Observation of the investment cycles in Figure 3 shows subdued cyclical activity with a
modest upward trend through the “Golden Age” (1950-1974), when there was a regulated
and but growing industrial structure. As the industrial structure became more deregulated
and mature, susceptibility increased with fears of overcapacity, technological frugality
and market uncertainty in the face of new (information technology) exogenous
innovations that threatened a shift to a completely new industrial paradigm (see Freeman
and Perez, 1988, pp. 52-3). The trend of the cycles has increased, as have the amplitudes
of these cycles. This increased volatility and rising trend since the 1979-81 “resources
boom” happen to coincide with when the R&D published figures first appear and help to
map the progress through structural change from the old dominant energy-based
technological paradigm to the new dominant information-based paradigm.
The observed increased volatility of investment cycles in the 1980s and 1990s raises
strong concern over the neoclassical interpretation of investment cycles that they are the
outcome of normal lumpiness of investment projects and the competitive pressures
towards efficient equilibrium. Lumpiness of investment in mature energy-based
manufacturing industries magnifies susceptibility in cycle troughs under conditions of
large excess capacity, as firms are hesitant to make large long-term future
commitments.
17 With the rise of information-based service industries, shorter time lags
and quicker modification of investment orders result in relatively smaller “lumps”, but
with more demand-responsive capacity decisions. This results in more unstable
investment cycles, having both very sharp investment expansions and then many small
business failures and much “reinventing the wheel” by new entrants.
18 Competitive
pressures lead to greater variations in susceptibility as expanding industries continually
move through technical and market uncertainty in the dynamics of disequilibrium.
Patents have a cyclical pattern in Figure 3 that closely resembles that of investment, but
at a consistently lower growth trend. Indicative of the established nature of the energy-
based technology paradigm, the early post-war has a stable and even slightly declining
                                                          
17 In aggregate terms this lumpiness tends to be “washed out” by the spread of investment spending over
many years and the bunching of investment by large firms in different industries of the immediate post-war.
(Courvisanos, 1996, pp. 211-2)
18 Early post-war evidence in the USA shows that “…there is a much wider fluctuation of capital
investment among small than among large organisations” (Boatwright, 1954, pp. 109-10).19
level of patents. From the mid-1960s there is a marked rising trend in patents and an
acceleration of this growth after the 1981-83 economic contraction, together with greater
volatility. There seems to be a particularly strong late 1990s rise in patents, but the time
period is too recent and too short to draw any conclusions yet from this. The pattern of
patents provides á priori support for the innovation-investment link developed in theory
above, and justifies examining this relationship through the R&D data available.
Figure 3:  Australian time series - investment, patents and GDP 1950-98
Sources: GDP: Groningen Growth and Development Center, Groningen University, the Netherlands.
Investment: Penn World Tables, downloaded from NBER, OECD Economic Outlook, June 1999.
Patents: US Patent and Trademark Office.
GDP in Figure 3 has a growth trend with no observable cyclical pattern, this is despite the
fact that GDP has experienced clear business cycles throughout the period. The scale of
the index and the strong trend disguise the relatively lower amplitude volatility in GDP
compared to investment and patent indices. Classical cycles with deviations from the
trend, and growth cycles of percentage changes in growth rate are the two common
methods of clearly identifying the peaks and troughs in GDP volatility. Pagan (1996, pp.
5-8) provides a history and dating of the Australian business cycles in both forms.
19
                                                          
19 Mercer-Melbourne Institute (various issues) provides a quarterly bulletin on “Reading of the Business
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Equation 4 is the basis of the following empirical investigation. A panel data set is
established with annual ABS data for I, P and RD for the period 1984-85 to 1997-98.
This covers the complete available annual RD data published by ABS. Two-digit industry
classifications are used to match respective spending in I (gross fixed capital expenditure)
and RD (business R&D expenditure) over the same year and then related to same year’s
P (gross profits).
The industry classification up till 1991-92 is ASIC, then its replacement by ANZSIC is
used, with a concordance conducted based on the ABS guidelines. Twelve initial ASIC
manufacturing sectors have been reduced to eight sectors in this concordance process.
The remaining sector is “Other Manufacturing”, but due to the major shifting of sub-
groups within this category between ASIC and ANZSIC, concordance could not be done,
and the whole sector has been removed from the panel data set. Four service sectors and
the mining sector are the non-manufacturing sectors in the panel data. Communication
Services and Scientific Research sectors have not been included since no profit figures
are available. This establishes a panel data set of 13 industry sectors with 178
observations.
20
Unit root tests are applied to this panel data and t-test statistics are obtained for intercept
(no trend) and for intercept with linear time trend. Both tests fail to reject the null of a
unit root in Investment, RD and P. The UR tests are based on the work of Im et al.
(1996) under the special circumstances of panel data. This involves doing a Dickey-Fuller
test for each industry and averaging the t-test statistics.
21 This result implies that the OLS
equations that are estimated have to be checked for cointegration, something that is done
by performing the same Im et al. (1996) test on the residuals from the OLS results.
The complete panel data set is put in log form, as per equation 4 with dummy variables
(DV) for the intercept value. Finance & Insurance and Property & Business sectors are
removed when the log form of the data is taken for regressions, since both exhibit
negative profit figures. This leaves a data set of 11 industries and 152 observations. OLS
regression is performed on the remaining 11 useable industry sectors with one year
lagged RD and P variables in respect to the I variable. The lags on both RD and P allow
time for the dynamic circular flows from these two variables to impact on the I variable,
and guarantee exogeneity of the regressors. The lags reduce the observations by one per
the eleven industry sectors, i.e. 141 observations remaining. Six separate regressions are
performed by choosing different sample sets from the panel data, reflecting various
aspects of the theoretical framework discussed in Section 3. Current (not real) dollar
values of all data are used to simulate the investment decision-making processes
occurring at the time and are not deflated by inflation indices.
Sample 1, as the standard regression result of the complete data, is the point of reference
for all the other sample regressions. Sample 2 is the available manufacturing industries
only and this set most resembles Sample 1. To examine volatility, the two expansions out
of the early 1980s and early 1990s recessions are looked at separately in Samples 3 and 4.
                                                          
20 See Appendix A for ABS sources of data, industry sector classifications and concordance issues.
21 See Appendix B for detailed initial UR results.21
Finally, the evolutionary life-cycle method reveals growth and mature industries, which
are then set up as separate Samples 5 and 6 respectively. As noted below, seven industries
are initially identified, unfortunately three growth industries have inadequate data for
OLS regressions to be conducted. All three are service-based industries, which indicates
the paucity of data coming out of statistical bureaus on the expanding services sectors.
Table 2 provides the essential results from the OLS regressions for each of the sample
sets. As already mentioned, we performed Im et al. (1996) root tests on the residuals of
the regressions documented in Table 2. In all cases, these tests rejected the hypothesis of
a unit root, indicating that the results in the table can indeed be interpreted as co-
integration equations. The details of these tests are documented in Table 3.
Table 2:  OLS regression results in six sample sets














1 0.9417 6.8E-72 0.193 3.3E-08 0.233 4.7E-07 0.2128 0.1869 0.8527
2 0.8857 1.5E-39 0.140 0.00067 0.250 2.6E-06 0.1163 0.2103 0.7920
3 0.9642 6.4E-17 0.534 2.8E-05 0.147 0.21532 0.4598 0.0524 0.8992
4 0.9568 5.3E-38 0.217 0.00253 0.208 7.7E-05 0.1337 0.2183 0.9064
5 0.9343 3.9E-25 0.142 0.00296 0.158 0.00481 0.1764 0.1602 0.8786
6 0.9605 8.5E-52 0.220 1.3E-06 0.475 1.9E-09 0.2550 0.3651 0.8673
Table 3:   Sample UR tests










































all 14 years 89 -2.67 -2.66
(5%)22
Explanation of the results is left for the next section when a story is fashioned around
these results. Sufficient here to define the terms in Table 2 and the strength of the
regression results. The R squares in all six samples show strong correlations in the
relation to the equation 4 with RD and P both lagged one year behind the I variable. All
six samples also indicate very significant F-values. The next column shows the elasticity
coefficient for RD. Generally this coefficient is roughly the same, if not higher, than the
P elasticity coefficient in a column further on. Only in Sample 6 (mature industries) is
this general pattern broken, with P coefficient more than double the value of the RD
coefficient. This seems intuitively appropriate, as mature industries would tend to be
influenced by profits much more than RD in their investment decisions. The respective
RD and P coefficients have P-values as shown in the relevant columns, reflecting strong
significance in the coefficient figures. The one non-significant exception is P for Sample
3 (Expansion A).
Unreported in Table 2 are the DV coefficients for each industry in each of the sample
regressions. All DV coefficients for all six sample sets range closely around four to six,
indicating a tightness of fit of all DV variables, irrespective of the tests conducted.
Sample 3 (Expansion A) has many more DV coefficients around 3.1 to 3.8 than in any
other sample set. Sample 5 (growth industries) has all its coefficients around the higher
range of 4.9 to 6.3, whereas Sample 6 (mature industries) in contrast has all its
coefficients around the lower range of 2.6 to 4.1 which indicates stronger profit-based
investment decision-making going on in mature industries.
The final three columns are partial determination (PD) coefficients for three independent
variables RD, P, and DV (as “one” variable) for each of the sample sets. These are
obtained by conducting partial R square regressions for each of the three variables in the
log series while holding the other two variables constant.
22 Such regressions give some
perspective on the proportions of the R square that can be attributed to each of the
independent variables. Each of the figures in these three columns can be viewed as an
index number explaining a proportion of variation in the I dependent variable. This can
be useful in understanding the variance (or volatility) when one sample is compared to
another in terms of the circular flow process. Not surprising in the model based on
equation 4, in which the other important variables of change in profits, excess capacity
and gearing ratios are explicitly absent, that DV has much the highest PD coefficient
variable in each of the six sample sets. Relevant to the dynamic innovation and
investment analysis is the relative values of RD and P within each sample and how these
relative values alter across these samples. Exposition of these relative values occurs in the
following section as part of the complete analysis of the results.
                                                          
22 The formula used for partial determination coefficient for I on RD (holding P and DV constant): The
numerator is: (sum of squares of regression [SSR] of all variables) minus (SSR of all variables except RD).
The denominator is: (total SSR model with all variables [TSS]) minus (SSR of all variables including RD)
plus (numerator). For example in Sample 1 for RD: TSS is 112.6797, SSR (all variables) is 106.1153, SSR
(all variables except RD) is 104.3399. Plugging the values in the formula, the coefficient is calculated to be
0.21288 as an index number for RD as the PD coefficient. Similarly, partial coefficients can be found for I
on P, and I on DV for each sample set.23
The evolutionary method is based on the industry life-cycle relations between innovation
and investment as depicted in Table 1. The case study pattern-matching approach to
qualitative data is applied in this method (see Yin, 1994). Specifically, this requires the
adoption of the available14 ABS industry sectors as individual case studies, upon which
the grid matrix of Table 1 is applied.
23 All the available annual data on R&D for each
industry are laid out on a spreadsheet with respect to human resources devoted to R&D;
R&D expenditure as a proportion of total R&D expenditure for the respective year; type
of R&D expenditure and activity. The level and rate of capital expenditure are also laid
for the corresponding years. For this method there is no need for a complete data set on
an annual basis, all available data are included in the spreadsheet. In most industries,
sporadic R&D data are available back to 1976-77 and all of it is included. Each case
study industry has its own pattern with respect to the above data, this pattern is identified
and classified in terms of per cent proportions; high/moderate/low levels;
rising/falling/stable over time. Then each industry is matched with the other industries to
identify similar patterns in specific aspects. These patterns are compared to the templates
of Table 1 and Figure 2 so that the industries can be classified in their stage of industry
development. This process provided the classification of growth and mature industries
used in Samples 5 and 6 in the panel data sets.
Table 4 summarises the results from evolutionary method. Not only have these results
been used to identify Samples 5 and 6, but they can also be used in their own right as
qualitative empirics in the analysis of results. Table 4 is arranged with all the identified
seven “growth” industries first, followed by the seven “mature” industries. Each of the
two sub-groups is arranged from highest to lowest R&D intensity. There are specific grid
matrices for each of the static, dynamic and volatility classifications; and individual
spreadsheets for each industry. Any of these separate tables can be obtained on request
from the corresponding author. A key to the code classifications appears at the bottom of
Table 4.
Brief outline of Table 4 results are presented here before they are incorporated in the
analysis in the next section. Second and third columns are quantitative R&D indicators of
the pace of innovation across industries in snapshot and early 1990s growth rates,
providing a reference point. These indicators are too limited and specific for evaluation of
the evolution processes going on over a longer time that influence innovation and
investment. A broader picture emerges over the next few columns. Size (static column),
change (dynamic column) and variance (volatility column) relate R&D to investment
expenditure. In these respects the seven “growth” industries show quite different patterns
of growth in both R&D and investment. Four “growth” industries (three of them services)
exhibited strong investment growth in the 1980s, but were relatively weak in 1990s. The
other three showed the reverse. There seems to be large investment volatility across this
“growth” group as a whole, but with generally rising R&D input. The seven “mature”
industries are more consistent across Table 4 with weak and relatively stable capital
                                                          
23 All 11 industries in the panel data set are included, plus the three service sector industries that were
dropped from the panel data due to the lack of a statistically complete set (Communication services) or due
to negative profits in log form (Property & Business; Finance & Insurance).24






























































































































































                                                          
24 Source: Mercer-Melbourne Institute (1998, Issue 2, p. 45, Table 2.2).
25 Source: Mercer-Melbourne Institute (1998, Issue 2, p. 45, Table 2.2).
26 See Appendix C for details of industry classifications (high-moderate-low) and their size calculations
with respect to expenditure relative to proportions spent on R&D and I by the private business sector as a
whole. First classification applies to R&D, second to I (R&D – I). R&D size also incorporates proportion of
human resources devoted.
27 See Appendix C for industry classifications and their relative change from the late 1970s to the late
1990s expenditure in respect to R&D and I. First classification applies to R&D, second to I (R&D – I).
28 See Appendix C for description of volatility in R&D and I from the late 1970s through to the late 1990s.
Arrows indicate general trend in the direction of volatility over this period. H means high relative volatility
in expenditure, while L means low relative volatility. The code “nodf” means no difference in volatility
over the period.25
expenditures, but with a large component of R&D still important in the six manufacturing
industries.
Finally, a simple and strongly prevailing pattern of R&D type can be discerned across all
14 industry sectors. In the 1970s and early 1980s, labour costs were the predominant type
of expenditure in all sectors, this has shifted to “other current costs” in all but three
(Property & bus; Finance & ins.; Printing, publ. & record.). This reflects the outsourcing
by contract of much of the R&D effort, while labour remains predominant. R&D activity
is consistently “experimental” by around 60-70% in all sectors (Wood & paper moved up
to 91% in the late 1990s), that reflects prototype development for Australian conditions
of overseas technology. Communications (based on limited data) is the only sector where
“applied research” is around 45-50% of all research activity. Human resources effort (in
person years) devoted to R&D is relatively low for all sectors except notably high for
Machinery & equipment, and some increase in the two growth service sectors, Wholesale
& retail and Property & business.
5.  The Story - Analysis of results
Rather than judging a set of hypotheses based on the empirical results presented in
Section 4 above, this section aims to tell a plausible dynamic story that has empirical
patterns which match many aspects of theory outlined in Section 3. First pattern is
derived from the OLS regressions, then the second pattern comes from the evolutionary
life-cycle results.
Initially, the OLS 11 industries “standard” in Table 2 indicates that lagged R&D
influence on investment (0.19) for all industries across the whole statistical test period is
only slightly less than profits lagged (0.23) and the difference is statistically non-
significant. This sets the foundation for innovation as a linked flow variable to
investment, along with profits. Partial determination coefficients show that variation in
investment accounted by RDt-1 (at index number 0.21) slightly exceeds Pt-1 (0.19). To see
the relative influence of RD on I, the other sub-sample results from Table 2 provide an
indication in relation to the standard result:
·  Manufacturing sees RD influence fall significantly relative to P (0.13 c.f. 0.25), and
variation index also fall relative to P (0.12 c.f. 0.21). Profits as the dependent
variable strengthens in manufacturing alone compared to standard. The role of RD
seems to be significant in the influence and variation on investment to the non-
manufacturing: mining (old paradigm) and services (new paradigm).
·  Expansion A shows a massive rise in the influence of RD (0.53), and the variation
index also similarly improves (0.46 for RD c.f. 0.05 for P). Variable P is non-
significant in this regression. The expansion out of the 1980s trough has RD of
significant importance both in terms of influence and on the steep rise in this
                                                                                                                                                                            
29 See spreadsheets of individual industries showing relative expansions of capital expenditure after
respective troughs in economic activity. Strong, moderate and weak indicate relative strength of capital
expenditure expansions. “V” refers to “very”. Spreadsheets available from corresponding author.26
expansion. The rise of the new paradigm is in evidence in this expansion, with
wholesale & retail, property & business, machinery & equipment all showing strong
RD and I expansion (finance & insurance and communications also show this pattern
in Expansion A on the individual spreadsheets but are not in the panel data).
·  Expansion B has results that fall back close to the standard results in influence of RD
(0.22) and P (0.21), but with the partial coefficients showing the variation index
close to the manufacturing only results (0.13 c.f. 0.22). Here DV is relatively the
strongest variation index (0.91). Two effects are taking place. First is the relatively
slow rise out of the early 1990s trough compared to Expansion A, due to greater debt
restructuring requirements and high excess capacities (traditional Kaleckian factors).
Second is the relatively low RD base in industries that produced strong I expansions
(wood & paper; print, pub &record; transport & storage). Property & business and
communications are strong I contributors in Expansion B, with rising RD influence
but are not in the panel data set (see individual spreadsheets).
·  Growth industries has the most peculiar results. Both RD and P fall to 0.14 and 0.16
(respectively) with non-significant difference between the two, and the DV
coefficients at their largest. Statistically there are many complex issues going on here
that remain unexplained. The partial coefficients are also low for both RD and P
(0.18 and 0.16, resp.). The “statistical loss” of three crucial services industries
matters (see Expansion A and B discussions where these industries are important
from the case study spreadsheet evidence). Wood & paper has the strongest industry
I expansion out of the early 1990s trough with significantly strong growth in RD (see
Table 4). In the “growth sample regression” the DV coefficient for this industry
(4.99) is significantly lower than wholesale & retail DV coefficient (6.32) that has
considerably less RD influence. Thus, the regressions are getting the directions of
influence consistent with the evolutionary method.
·  Mature industries has a more consistent pattern. Both RD and P have stronger
coefficients, but P is significantly more influential at 0.47 (c.f. 0.22 for RD, close to
standard), which is supportive of the Kaleckian role of profits in mature industries.
DV coefficients are at their lowest influence here relative to all other samples
Variation through partial coefficients shows again the role of P relative to RD (0.37
c.f. 0.255, resp.). This regression sample strongly supports the role of profits that
“fossilises” reinvestment in mature industries, despite the ascent of the new
technology paradigm.
A look at the partial coefficient indices as a whole is instructive. All six samples have DV
indices around a tight band (0.79 for manuf. to 0.91 for Expansion B), P indices have a
wider range (0.05 for Exp. A to 0.36 for mature), but generally around 0.21. The RD
indices are the widest (0.13 for Exp. B to 0.46 for Exp. A), reflecting the much more
differential effect on investment variation from this variable compared to P and DV. This
is consistent with the role of innovation, particularly in a period of strong structural
change, and reflects RD variation in itself contributing to the volatility of the I variable.27
An examination of the evolutionary method results from Table 4, confirming the patterns
of innovation, profits and investment identified through the OLS regression results and
adding a degree of qualitative pattern behaviour not available from regressions. Table 4
breaks up into two sections reflecting differences between the seven growth and seven
mature industries. An analysis of each follows:
·  Growth industries group: There is a marked diversity in this group (“growth through
diversity”). The two strong manufacturing industries, machinery & equipment and
wood & paper, begin their growth from very different basis. The former was a large
RD-based sector in the 1970s, which has been able to transform itself effectively by
adopting reasonably quickly the new information technology paradigm. The latter
was a small sector in severe decline in the 1970s, which has had a very strong
turnaround in the 1990s from a very low base. All the four “growth” service
industries are also different, with finance & insurance the most problematic in this
group, having had a very impressive 1980s expansion but a very poor record in both
R&D and I in the 1990s. Printing, publishing & recorded media sector is showing
nascent signs of growth, especially in the area of multi-media activities only recently
added into this sector. Communications and property & business providing a strong
base of investment through innovation, but through different mechanisms. Property &
business has seen significant rise from spending only 5.6 % of total R&D expenditure
for the year 1976-77, to where the latest figures show spending of 15.3% in 1997-98.
Communications R&D is poorly reported in the ABS, but available data shows it as
the only sector with nearly 50% in applied research. Also, studies in this industry
indicate that innovation comes through large enterprises that have much different
innovation mechanisms than standard R&D spending (Rogers, 1998).
·  Mature industries group: There is a marked uniformity in this group, based around
the protection of existing MOP and the tendency for capital stock to become
“fossilised” in Salter’s terms. The larger “mature” industries remain strong through
substantial reinvestment programmes. Thus, despite weak investment cycle
expansions they have large absolute investment spending (especially transport &
storage and mining industries). This indicates that the old energy-based paradigm still
represents a power base to capitalism and will remain so for quite a while yet. The
interesting point is that as a group there is a large labour cost-experimental R&D
input into this foundation, with relatively stable but trend declining investment cycles.
Only one is a service industry, and it is the most stable of all 14 industries but with
virtually no R&D (transport & storage). The manufacturing “mature” industries
depend on R&D for reinvestment and their relative monopoly control in the economy,
however their R&D tends to be “experimental”, which is endogenous innovation.
Even their adoption of the information technology paradigm tends to be an “add-on”
to their MOP rather than fundamental change to the nature of their production
systems.
In terms of Figure 2, the Australian two-digit private business industry sectors can be
placed within the following stages of industrial development:28
·  Infant: Scientific research.
·  Growth – Part I (rapidly evolving): *Property & business; Communications;
Machinery & equipment.
·  Growth – Part II (consolidating): *Wholesale & retail; Finance & insurance.
·  Mature: *Mining; *Transport & storage; Petrol, coal & chemical; Metals; Non-
metals; Food, beverage & tobacco; Textile, clothing, footwear & leather.
·  Transition: Wood & paper; Printing, publishing & recorded media.
The four significant large capital expenditure industries in Australia are marked with an
asterisk (*). This spreads the private gross fixed investment over the major stages of
industrial development reflecting both the old and new paradigms in action despite the
clear shift in growth and transition to information technology systems.
The above analysis of results can be placed within the theoretical structure of Section 3 in
a way that relates the evolution of industrial development to the circular flow of
innovation and investment. Many studies confirm Australia’s comparative disadvantage
in R&D intensive manufacturing and that Australia has benefited less from international
R&D spillovers than all or most other small OECD nations (Engelbrecht, 1998, p. 184).
Our results on R&D type activity echo this concern, with dominance of labour-
experimental research and relatively low human resources effort. In his own study
Engelbrecht (1998) notes that the role of business R&D has increased from the beginning
of the 1980s to 0.87% of GDP in 1995, still well below the OECD at 1.45%. This places
the RD variable into context, although Gregory (1993) argues that Australian innovation
peculiarities are better captured in the L term of equation 1 under the complete NIS.
Tensions exist between the mature industry sectors with “fossilised” MOP and relatively
weak RD and the growth industry sectors with information technology systems backed by
rising business RD. The tensions materialise in two forms. First is as “roadblocks” by the
still strong monopoly controlled mature industries to further innovation and investment.
This creates, as noted in the theory, by a mismatch of current investment to new available
technology and the weakening of the “cluster-bunching” effect in the growth sectors.
Second is with endogenous innovation supporting mature industries provides weak input
into a mechanism for strong investment cycle recovery. This exhibited itself with the
extended period taken for investment to recover out of the early 1990s trough compared
to the early1980s. Then once a strong investment boom is under way (as in the late
1990s), these tensions create susceptibility to downturns. This is reflected in the “safety”
option of profit-based reinvestment in mature industries, or in speculative behaviour in
shares on “Internet” stocks rather than productive investment in new technology.
Supporting this proposition in Australia is the “extremely volatile” business investment
through 1998-99, which has produced a net zero growth over this period (Mercer-
Melbourne Institute, 1999, Issue 3, pp.24-5). The two innovation-based tension
mechanisms exacerbate volatility in investment. In Australia’s case this means a lengthy
time for investment to establish a sustainable recovery and, then, strong GDP growth with
growing susceptibility to a sharp and deep investment downturn.
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30 Compared to the European case where volatility means shorter time to renew investment, but with
frequent shallow investment downturns and relatively lower GDP growth rates (see Section 3).29
The tensions between the two exogenous innovation forces described above also manifest
themselves in the two circular flow processes described in Section 3.2. Both processes are
in evidence at the same time in Australia. The virtuous circle feeds through both RD and
P to greater I, and stronger GDP to produce a strong recovery phase and powerful
susceptibility pressures towards the peak of the investment cycle. The vicious circle is
evident at two levels. At the national level, the tensions described above materialise
through relatively poor Australian RD flowing into the NIS. This places increasing
pressure on the L term to sustain Australia’s endogenous innovation input into
investment, which has significant public policy implications. Either dependence must
continue to increase on external private sector L inputs like licensing, foreign direct
investment, joint ventures from abroad, borrowed technology; or the public sector needs
to reverse its current tendency for reducing its innovation input and, instead, expand
domestic-based innovation. If external-based L is not forthcoming (or external private
innovation shifts towards other peripheral nations), then I can be under severe threat in its
ability to deliver strong sustainable levels. Then P-based reproduction in the old
technology paradigm dominates, with lower profits and a vicious circle effect becomes
powerful.
At the regional level, small isolated peripheral sub-national areas in Australia have been
historically based on the old paradigm and as a result are in economic decay. The vicious
circle is operating very powerfully in these areas, as reduced P from traditional energy
and resources-based production reinforces low investment levels. Precious little P is
flowing into RD, and the L term is only sustained with the old paradigm-based input from
external sources. Here, there is a strong case for public policy intervention towards a
strategic shift to the new paradigm and an exogenous innovation base that can end this
vicious circle, since systemic failures prevent “market forces” from providing this
structural change.
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6.  The Technical Details and Limitations
The research and analysis above has some serious limitations stemming from the
technical details involved in collating and analysing data, applying such data results to
the issue at hand, and in the theoretical tools currently available to derive conclusions.
These three sets of limitations are briefly acknowledged in this section in terms of the
technical details they contain. In this way, the signs are clear that overcoming such
technical problems will also reduce the limitations of this study.
6.1  Collating and analysing data
R&D data has only relatively recently been available in OECD nations, and collation has
been particularly late in Australia, when it supposedly became an annual survey only
from 1984-85.
32 This provides only a limited number of observations (152) for empirical
                                                          
31 For detailed analyses of this regional policy issue in relation to Australia, with specific application to the
small peripheral region of Tasmania, see Courvisanos (2000a, 2000b, 2000c).
32 R&D data became available in the late 1970s in most OECD nations (Mercer-Melbourne Institute, 1998,
Issue 2, p. 39).30
analysis, and even less in the sub-samples. Even after that date, due to public sector
budget cuts, these surveys have not been conducted in some years. In those years (1985-
86, 1987-88, 1989-90) the research relies on the stratified random sample of businesses
conducted by the ABS on an aggregate basis and then our own interpolation based on the
past year and the year ahead.
33 Also in two industry sectors (Transport & storage, Finance
& insurance), collection of R&D data began in 1986-87 instead of the standard 1984-85.
Further statistical problems include need for concordance after the shift from ASIC to
ANZSIC classifications, and due to different survey techniques and different categories
used in R&D data collation compared to capital expenditure and profit data collation. The
latter two are manufacturing-based, while R&D data has an OECD agreed innovation
standard that does not quite coincide with the former. Also, ABS alters categories within
industry sectors to reflect changes in their activities, especially in the services sectors.
Much of this involves shifting categories from one sector grouping to another, especially
out of “other” into specific sectors (e.g. recorded media). Concordance of all such
changes requires some arbitrary borderline decisions and inconsistencies inevitably arise.
Manufacturing accounts for around 57% of total business R&D, reflecting the dominance
of the old manufacturing-based technology paradigm in the supply of machinery and
equipment, despite application of R&D (and innovation) throughout the whole economy.
ABS data collection echoes this manufacturing bias in R&D data collection and also
accounts for the very high R&D intensity for the Machinery & equipment sector (6.5).
Since much of the R&D effort in the service sectors is based around the new information
technology paradigm, it is not classified by ABS as such. This may explain the very low
R&D intensities for the services sectors, especially the 0.3 intensity for Wholesale &
retail and Finance & insurance sectors (Mercer-Melbourne Institute, 1998, Issue 2, p. 44).
For this reason R&D intensities are not used as basis for regressions in the statistical
analysis.
Finally, there are technical problems in the regression analysis of the data. The unit root
test accepted the null hypothesis of a unit root in RD and P in its absolute values. This
prevented any regression of variance tests and panel data regressions on the absolute data.
The log form of the data for cointegration tests have no such unit root problem, but as a
result two crucial service industries are excluded as they have negative profit figures.
6.2 Applying the results
In applying the results, the analysis relies on R&D input and leaves the L term as given
(in the intercept). With R&D costs below 50% of total innovation expenditure, there are
concerns raised that “…R&D data may give a misleading picture of the extent of
innovation.” (Mercer-Melbourne Institute, 1998, Issue 2, p. 45) Based on the circular
flow diagram, the linkage of R&D directly to investment and GDP is stronger than the
use of other innovative intellectual property activities of trademarks and patents.
34 The
                                                          
33 For details of formula see Appendix A.
34 As Mortimer (1997, p. 14) states, “[i]nnovation is a key driver of growth, and GDP per capita is highly
correlated to R&D intensity among developed nations”.31
latter activities often take a longer and certainly more indefinite time period than the one-
year regression lag to become incorporated into the investment process. While the other
significant innovative activity of “tooling-up” is directly registered in investment
spending itself.
R&D theoretically is also powerful in the way it can link equally with both endogenous
and exogenous innovation as shown in the theory discussions earlier. Freeman (1995, p.9)
emphasises this point by noting how significant and widespread R&D activity has
developed in the last 50 years, especially in terms of the “monopoly power” of large
corporations which play an important part of the circular flow dynamics. Compare this to
patent applications which are important for small firms (Rogers, 1998, p.51), but the
investment effects are much more tenuous as many small firms fail and the innovation
process becomes for complex and convoluted before it registers through the investment
process. Further, R&D is a formal process into business planning and linked directly in
many plans to investment decision-making (Engelbrecht, 1998, p.184). This is important
for both business and public policy implications that come out of this research.
The recognised weakness in R&D statistical collection (Section 6.1) and the problems of
defining innovation in terms of R&D as the independent variable (this section), point to
the need for a broader innovation research programme. Rooney and Mandeville (1998, p.
461) explain that most NIS studies have been “…rather narrowly focussed on R&D”,
when the expanding service sector does not do much R&D as traditionally defined in
Fordist-based ABS data. Service industries innovate via learning-by-doing and adapting
information technology to produce new processes and products. This clearly points to the
need for broadening the analysis of this paper to incorporate the other forms of innovative
activity apart from the R&D input variable. However, before that can be done at an
empirical level, there is need to revise the theory to show clearly how these other
innovation activities link to the investment decision-making processes.
6.3   Theoretical limits
The R&D link to investment is only one of the fundamental limitations of the theoretical
model used in this research. There is also the neglect of profit changes, excess capacity
and increasing risk. These elements figure significantly in the susceptibility investment
model of Courvisanos (1996), yet are taken as given here. The data and statistical
problems unfortunately compound as attempts are made to introduce these further
elements. So this effort can be justified as a “first step”.
Of more concern are the limitations of theory construction at this time in the history of
economic thought. The continual obsession with the statics (and comparative statics) of
innovation and investment limit any efforts to further develop the dynamic analysis of
innovation and investment. This is a “mainstream” issue that others can tackle (e.g.
adding the concept of innovation into the “options to invest” model of Dixit and Pindyck,
1994).32
From the heterodox perspective, the concern is the lack of coherence in tackling the
dynamic issues in this paper. There are the important dynamic analyses of evolutionary
and Austrian economics. Both provide long-term perspective, but fail to understand the
macroenvironment within which the tensions of the circular flow develop. On the other
hand, the Post-Keynesian literature has only sporadically tried to look at these questions
through strong behavioural elements in the investment decision-making process, but they
generally fail to grasp the dynamic elements that the previous two schools emphasise.
The new cognitive approach based on Herbert Simon (and more recently Gerald
Silverberg) may provide an important future link between the “givens” of the long-term
evolutionary analysis and the behavioural-cum-power relations in the Kaleckian analysis.
7.  The Summary - Policy implications and future research
The dynamics of innovation and investment involve a threading together evolutionary
life-cycle of industry development through innovative processes with Kaleckian extended
reproduction through volatility of the investment process. Tension between virtuous and
vicious circular flow effects operate to create uncertainty and strategic planning that lead
to patterns of industry and economy-wide development of cumulative expansion (and
booms) along with periods of cumulative destruction and insecurity. The latter produce
problematic efforts to innovate, which can result in renewed strong investment expansion
or extended periods of small investment (mini-)cycles. The results of the panel data
regressions support the circular flow mechanisms, while the evolutionary data method
supports the stages of industry development and their respective contributions to the
circular flow dynamics. The limitations outlined in the previous section point to how this
threading together can be effectively tackled further.
From a policy perspective, the analysis in this paper indicates a need for a clear policy
framework in a dynamic environment. The policy framework needs to address both the
strategic planning of business and the public policies of the state in providing a more
stable and sustainable investment regime both in terms of equity and the ecosystem. This
requires another research project. Sufficient in this final passage to indicate signs towards
the type of policy responses that this research points towards.
In private business, strategic planning must move away from simplistic static flow-charts
of “how-to-do”, and instead develop a better understanding of the dynamic tensions in the
type of circular flow chart presented in this paper. The introduction of major innovations
initially depends on finance for R&D and the ability to develop a cluster of successful
innovations that are capable of creating cumulative accumulation. Small firms often lack
sufficient retained earnings through profits or a strong equity base. Large firms often are
locked-in to sustaining old capital stock values to the detriment of innovative activity and
maintaining a vicious circle of low innovation and investment. Transition of large firms
with the synergistic support of small innovate firms provides some route out of these
tensions towards a virtuous circle effect. Even such expansion needs to be carefully
monitored to avoid the cumulative susceptibility of over-investment and very sharp
investment downturn that replaces virtuous with vicious circle effects.33
For public policy, the issue is whether the current circular flow effects are sustainable and
in what direction. If regions, sectors or even nations exhibit strong remorseless vicious
circles based on support for “fossilised” capital values, then systemic failure of capitalism
ensures that shifting to an innovative creative accumulation can only be done through
strategic intervention. This requires an understanding of human agency processes in the
private sector, particularly in relation to uncertainty and ability to gain voluntary
conformity for a “new direction” that does not merely tamper at the edges with static
policy tools of depreciation allowances and more subsidies. Even booming virtuous
circles are problematic given their susceptibility to investment downturns that can destroy
voluntary conformity already there. Thus, systemic failure is also waiting on the wings of
boom economies and industries that need state amelioration (or what Adolph Lowe called
“regularisation”) of the investment cycle. This is required to ensure long-term stability
and importantly continued voluntary conformity in periods when virtuous circles tend to
mature into fossilised monopoly power positions that are destabilising.34
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Appendix A: Data Sources and Industry Sector Classifications
Sources for the Panel Data
For I: Australian Bureau of Statistics (various issues), Private New Capital Expenditure,
Cat. No. 5625.0, Canberra.
For RD: Australian Bureau of Statistics (various issues), Research and Experimental
Development: Business Enterprises, Australia, Cat. No. 8104.0, Canberra.
For  P: Australian Bureau of Statistics (various issues), Company Profits, Cat. No.
5651.0, Canberra.
The following 13 industry sectors were set up in the panel data:
Industry sector  ANZSIC classifications
Mining 11-15
Manufacturing -
Food, beverages and tobacco (FBT) 21
Textiles, clothing, footwear & leather (FBTL) 22
Wood & paper products 23
Printing, publishing & recorded media 24
Petroleum, coal, chemical & associated products 25
Non-metallic mineral products 26
Metal products 27
Machinery & equipment 28
Services -
Wholesale & retail trade F-G
Finance & insurance K
Property & business services 77, 782-786
Transport & storage I
Classification changes and resulting data requirements:
1.  The ASIC classification has been replaced by the ANZSIC classification (above)
from 1992-93. Concordance guidelines set up by ABS to match the two systems of
classification are used in developing a consistent panel data series for the 13 sectors
as specified above. Some minor classification problems remain which concordance
could not resolve which do not make the data completely consistent between the
ASIC and ANZSIC categories. ABS authorities have assured us that these
inconsistencies are very minor it terms of the total expenditures for these particular
industry sectors identified below:
·  Mining under ASIC excludes services to mining, while it includes it under
ANZSIC.
·  Leather manufacturing subdivision (under “Other manufacturing” in ASIC, but
can not be identified as a separate item) has been included with the Textile,
clothing and footwear (ASIC classification) only from 1992-93 to form TCFL.40
2.  Private New Capital Expenditure figures are in accordance with ANZSIC from 1987-
88. Prior to that the figures are in accordance to ASIC and this is unpublished data
that is supplied by the ABS office on request.
3.  R&D Expenditure figures are in accordance with ANZSIC from 1992-93. Prior to that
the figures are in accordance to ASIC.
4.  Company profit (before income tax) figures are in accordance with ANZSIC from
1985-86. Prior to that the figures are in accordance to ASIC. ANZSIC classification is
unpublished data and supplied by the ABS office on request.
5.  Two ASIC sub-divisions have been combined to form one ANZSIC industry sector
and extended back to the beginning of the panel data series. This has been done in
two separate cases:
·  Basic metal products (ASIC 29) and Fabricated metal products (ASIC 31) form
Metal products sector (ANZSIC 27)
·  Transport equipment (ASIC 32) and Other machinery & equipment (ASIC 33)
form Machinery & equipment (ANZSIC 28).
6.  Data for Transport & storage classification category is unpublished and supplied by
ABS on request. Categories 263 (paper and paper products) and 264 (printing and
allied services) have unpublished RD and I figures, also supplied by ABS on request.
Data available for all industries from 1984-85 to 1997-98 (14 years), except for:
1.  R&D expenditure for years 1985-86, 1987-88, 1989-90 are not available. Only total
estimated R&D expenditure figures are available for these specific years. These
estimates have been derived by ABS using a stratified random sample of businesses.
The method used to calculate values for these years for the respective industry sectors
is as outlined below, using FBT for 1985-86 as the example:
R&D expenditure on FBT in 1985-86 =
{(R&D expenditure on FBT in 1984-85 / Total R&D expenditure on all
industries in 1984-85) + (R&D expenditure on FBT in 1986-87 / Total
R&D expenditure on all industries in 1986-87)} /2
This expression is multiplied by Total R&D stratified sample expenditure
in 1985-86. This provides the R&D expenditure for FBT in 1985-86.
2.  Transport & storage and Finance & insurance have RD figures available only from
1986-87 (12 years), so the panel data series for these two industries began two years
later in both cases. This is gives us 178 initial panel data observations instead of 182
(13 industries by 14 years).41
Appendix B: Initial UR Test Results on Panel Data 1984-85 to 1997-98
Based on 13 industries with 178 observations in non-lagged and non-log form.
Test statistics for intercept
(no trend)
Test statistics for intercept and
linear time trend
Industry I RD P IR DP
Mining 2.81 -0.77 -1.87 1.50 -2.40 -2.33
FBT 0.72 -1.40 0.217 -1.15 -3.00 -3.68
TCFL -2.57 -0.21 -2.84 -2.27 -2.57 -2.55
Wood &
paper
-1.90 -1.35 -1.16 -1.87 -3.08 -1.87
Print,
publish.
-2.29 -0.57 -0.49 -3.07 -2.69 -1.86
Petrol,
coal & ch.
-2.14 -0.85 -2.02 -1.12 -1.87 -2.16
Non-metal
Products
-2.44 -0.31 -1.93 -3.40 -1.98 -1.76
Metal
Products
-3.69 -0.93 -2.08 -3.83 -2.49 -2.22
Machinery
& equip.
-0.80 -0.42 -1.59 -1.29 -2.28 -2.81
Wholesale
& retail
-1.47 -1.13 -2.31 -2.33 -3.41 -2.23
Finance &
insur.
-3.68 -2.79 -0.82 -3.65 -2.12 -3.82
Property
& bus.
-2.17 2.17 -2.13 -2.07 0.14 -1.94
Transport
& stor.
-2.01 -2.84 -1.67 -1.87 -2.25 -2.07
Av. t-test
statistic












-1.90 -1.90 -1.90 -2.54 -2.54 -2.5442
Appendix C:
Sources for the Evolutionary Method
R&D data on human resources, expenditure, type of R&D, type of R&D activity are all
obtained from: Australian Bureau of Statistics (various issues), Research and
Experimental Development: Business Enterprises, Australia, Cat. No. 8104.0, Canberra.
Capital expenditure data: Australian Bureau of Statistics (various issues), Private New
Capital Expenditure, Cat. No. 5625.0, Canberra.
The data for this method covers the period 1976-77 to 1997-98. The early R&D data is
sporadic, with figures generally for only years 1976-77, 1978-79 and 1981-82. The
complete R&D data series begins from 1984-85 as per the details in Appendix A.
There are 14 industry sectors that form the basis for this evolutionary method. This
consists of the same 13 industry sectors as in Appendix A plus Communication Services
(ASIC: H; ANZSIC: J). The available data for the Communications sector is too sporadic
to be used in the panel data series where continuous annual data is required. The
evolutionary method can identify some trends by examining the sporadic data and
comparing the trends over time to other sectors with more continuous data series.
Calculations of Code Classifications in Table 4
1.  Human resources devoted to R&D (persons years):
In analysing the person year effort on R&D for any industry, a scale has been formulated.
The scale is from zero to the highest person years for that particular year for any industry
sector. Each year is examined across all industries with the following code classification.
The industry with the highest person years is the standard. “High” is where an industry is
either 50 per cent or more of the highest person years in the highest industry. If an
industry falls within the lower 50 per cent value of the highest person years industry, then
“Low” is where it is in the scale of zero to 40 per cent within this sub-category, and
“Moderate” is the remaining 60 per cent.
2.  R&D industry expenditure as a proportion of total R&D expenditure of all industries
for that year:
(i)  Static measure based on a scale from zero to the highest expenditure for that
particular year. For each year comparison is made on the expenditure across all
industries.
High: represents the levels of expenditure in the upper one third of the scale.
Low: represents the levels of expenditure in the lower one third of the scale.
Moderate: the remaining third of the values.
(ii)  Dynamic measure based on the changes in the percentages of total R&D
expended over the period 1976-77 to 1997-98.43
Stable: where the percentages remain roughly the same between the late 1970s and the
late 1990s (within two per cent up/down).
Growth: where the percentages show significant increase between the late 1970s and the
late 1990s (two per cent or more).
Decline: where the percentages show significant decrease between the late 1970s and the
late 1990s (two per cent or more).
3.  Investment industry expenditure levels in respect to total gross fixed private capital
expenditures for that year:
(i)  Static measure based on a scale from zero to the highest expenditure for that
particular year. For each year comparison is made on the expenditure across all
industries.
High: represents the levels of expenditure in the upper one third of the scale.
Low: represents the levels of expenditure in the lower one third of the scale.
Moderate: the remaining third of the values.
(ii)  Dynamic measure based on the rate of expenditure growth for a particular
industry from the preceding year.
Stable: where the percentages remain roughly the same between the late 1970s and the
late 1990s (average of less than ten per cent change over two years).
Growth: where the percentages show significant increase between the late 1970s and the
late 1990s (average of ten per cent or more over two years).
Decline: where the percentages show significant decrease between the late 1970s and the
late 1990s (average of ten per cent or more over two years)
4.  Volatility of R&D expenditure from the late 1970s to the late 1990s:
No difference: refers to essentially no change in the proportions of expenditure in
industry compared to total R&D expenditure throughout this period.
High:  indicates strong intensity in expenditure proportion changes, reflecting
significantly high variance over time (two per cent or more change in proportions). This
variance may tend to show upwards (Ý) or downwards (ß) volatility.
Low: indicates weak intensity in expenditure proportion changes, reflecting low variance
in percentages over time (less than two per cent). This variance may tend to show
upwards (Ý) or downwards (ß) volatility.
5.  Volatility of investment expenditure from the late 1970s to the late 1990s:
No difference: refers to essentially no change in the percentages of expenditure
throughout this period.
High:  indicates strong intensity in expenditure changes, reflecting significantly high
variance in rate of growth over time (20 per cent or over). This variance may tend to
show upwards (Ý) or downwards (ß) volatility.
Low: indicates weak intensity in expenditure changes, reflecting low variance in rate of
growth over time (less than 20 per cent). This variance may tend to show upwards (Ý) or
downwards (ß) volatility.44
7.  Recovery from the two recessions 1981-83 and 1989-91:
Strong: immediately following these years the rate of growth of investment expenditure
in the sector shows strong upward movement (in the range of over 20 per cent).
Moderate: immediately following these years the rate of growth of investment
expenditure in the sector shows some upward movement, but it is between the range of
10 to 20 percent and may also be delayed by a year or two compared to the “strong”
group.
Weak: low (below 10 per cent) growth out of the recession.
None: no growth out of the recession (or even decline in growth rate) after the recession.